Century End Reflections on l984

As my research has produced more data about George Bush's "secret war against the Jew-s", including his May, 1984 authorization of, in the words of John Loftus and Mark Aarons "the most massive surveillance of American Jewish citizens in history" and "at a level that would have made even James Angleton or Dulles blush" (Loftus and Aarons 420-1). I've been brought back to a broader reflection on the 1984 Presidential election.

At first glance this might seem irrelevant. What's past is past. But insights into the undercurrents that were the real sources of events--rather than the events that at the time were perceived as the sources of those events--can yield productive insights into the real problems and the real solutions presently before us.

1984: Walter Mondale, John Glenn, Gary Hart, Jesse Jackson were the main names the Democratic Party was presenting to the American voters as the party primaries geared up. The grueling contest between Hart and Mondale was a near-draw, and analysts were quick to point out that this was a generational phenomenon as well as a regional one.

Mondale appealed to the traditional Democratic base, older voters from ethnic and blue-collar backgrounds, still based in the Rust Belt industrial states--victims rather than beneficiaries of the new Post-Industrial Age. Hart, on the other hand, was a Westerner, appealing to younger voters of the Computer Age, much less daunted by Reaganesque "free trade" policies, and relating to Jackson in yet another way. based on a different tvpe of racial progressivism, born not of political self-interest but of actual life experience.

Other names were out there and by 1988 those names were very much brought before the national consciousness. One that particularly stands out is that of Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, senior Senator and experienced moderate. All of those names have been evaluated by political analysts as to their relative strengths and weaknesses and most have been found wanting. But we must recall now that the source of strength of the Republican Presidential candidates, in both the 1972 and 1984 49-state landslides, was not entirely legitimate.

We now know both may well have won against the tickets they were pitted against in their re-election bids. But it is highly doubtful they'd have won by that kind of a margin. This may seem an irrelevancy' but it is not. given the fact that important data about Bush and others seems to have been kept from us.

Indeed. far from being irrelevant, it is pivotal if we are to engage the real issues and problems before us as a nation in a realistic way. In pitting various imaginary Democratic tickets against Reagan and Bush in l984, for example, one gains certain insights as to the real political strengths of the various existing tickets at that time.

To start, let's take a ticket composed of the following: John Glenn with Gary Hart as his vice-president. We see Glenn in debate with Reagan and Hart in debate with Bush. We see that the debates would have been a near-draw at the Presidential end, but a definite Democratic victory at the vice-presidential.. We see Glenn able to carry Ohio and perhaps Michigan, with a definite prospect of carrying the state of Florida. We see Hart making inroads among Yuppies and voters in the West, with the definite prospect of carrying Colorado and Hawaii for the ticket (in combination with Glenn's appeal).

We also see the absence of the kind of "scandal" that may have cost the Democrats Ferraro's New York.

We see the alienated steel rnill workers of Pennsylvania, definitely against Reagan, but bewildered by Mondale's own record tn that regard as Jrnuny Carter's vice-president, as persons who would turn out for the Glenn/Hart ticket.

But could such a ticket have actually defeated the Reagan/Bush ticket? Texas was still in the GOP column, as was the rest of the south besides Florida and Maryland. Could Glenn really have carried the state of Indiana through regional appeal alone? And what of Illinois~ a swing state, a state in which Jesse Jackson's support, applied in the right places, could have been pivotal?

California would probably still have been Reagan's to lose. It would be closer, and down to the wire, but Reagan would probably have carried it. Though Hart would have appeal in New York state, as would Glenn, would they have enough appeal? Thev were from the West, and looking even further West and even up into Space.

And what of states such as New Jersey, Montana, the Dakotas, Missouri ? What of Iowa? Clearly, this ticket would have its work cut out for it, among farmers, among older voters. Clearly, against Reagan's incumbency, it would have trouble scrambling up coattails in Congress as well.

Nevertheless, it displays some strengths that cannot be readily written off. Though probably a losing ticket, it reveals real potential to turn over the Senate to the Democrats. Though not a winning ticket, a 49-state Reagan sweep seems less likely.

What this also reveals, as one thinks about it, is that the Mondale-Ferraro ticket itself must have been actually stronger than the 1984 election results revealed. Why? Because there is too much of a gap, an inexplicable gap, in the fortunes of the Glenn-Hart ticket versus the Mondale-Ferraro ticket. With Jesse Jackson in the background as a new vote generator, it reveals a gap not explained by conventional analyses of that election.

Some interesting data is available on voting trends in the 1984, in books such as The Quest for the Presidency 1984 by Peter Goldman and Tony Fuller. The book reveals, (249 and 454), polls showing Mondale's approval ratings on two widely-separated dates in 1984 as within 5 points of Reagan's--that also coming in the aftermath of Reagan's dramatic 1982-83 drop in the polls as the result of the economic recession of that period, in which unemployment rates reached 10%, Depression levels:

"For a worrisome time, their moment seemed to be slipping from them entirely. The economy slid into the worst times since the Depression, dragging Reagan's popularity down with it. His Gallup rating bottomed near the Carter lattitudes, at 35 percent and his part~r lose twenty-six seats in the House of Representatives; the bipartisan conservative majority that had carried the Reagan revolution was gone...At low ebb, in a series of meetings in the winter of 1982-83, his handlers had advised him...that he had deep troubles, so deep that he could indeed be beaten as badly as he had beaten Carter two years before (20-1)." Subsequently evaluating Mondale's party's fortunes on Presidential election night 1984, they also note that this trend never really reversed: Reagan never regained control of the Congress for his revolution: "As the real returns piled up, it became evident that the ruin was not quite that complete; the party had gained two seats in the Senate, and its losses in the House had been held within retrievable bounds (360). "

Reagan's bare majonty in the Senate--the only house of Congress his party ever "controlled" during his Administration--was never more than a bare, unworking one that was largely the result of the death of Henry "Scoop" Jackson of (D. Wash.) in 1983 and his replacement by an appointed Republican in that year, and the retirement of Independent Harry Byrd of Virginia and his replacement in an election that was not a defeat of the Democrats so much as conservative Independents by the Republicans. Those two seats were all that had kept him from having a mere tie in the Senate--and at a time when, supposedly, he was at the zenith of his popularity, late 1983. Neither of those seats were gained through conventional election procedures at that time. Clearly, there were discrepancies as to how to read Reagan's real popularity.

(Geraldine Ferraro, as might be expected, provides some of the most impressive clata in her bookMy Story about the 1984 Presidential election, in which she was the vice­presidential candidate with Democrat Mondale):

"In Illinois a Gallup poll now had us down only two points. And Reagan had finally given us a real opening. The Republicans had been beating us up from the beginning when Fritz had said up front at the convention that he was going to have to raise taxes--and so would Ronald Reagan. For three months Reagan had walked around saying he was absolutely not going to raise taxes--until a leak from the Treasury Department four days before the election suggested othenvise (Ferraro 296)."

Though there were downsides--Reagan was attempting to beg off and postpone a response to his Treasury Department's report until after the election--Ferraro goes on to note:

"For a moment the next morning, my hopes skyrocketed. A Harris poll released Monday, November 5, started: 'In a dramatic eleventh hour turn, the race for the presidency is narrowing.' Reagan's lead had dropped in the last few days from nineteen points to twelve. When measured against the scale of the negative vote--people who were voting against, rather than for the candidate--Reagan's edge had dropped even further, to seven points."

"Democrats were leading in the races for the House, the swey went on, and in a last-minute reversal, for the Senate as well. The gender-gap spread was widening. Men were still going for Reagan over Mondale by a twenty-four-point margin, but the margin of women for Reagan had dropped from an eleven-point lead only the week before to a 'razor thin' margin now of just one point. That shift, coupled with Harris's assertion that the likelihood of both women and blacks voting was increasing, while that of men and young people was not, threw new doubt on the outcome of the election (Ferraro 297-8)."

Trying not to be overly optimistic, Ferraro continued:

"As we left Cleveland, we began to focus on the fact that the election the next day was hopeless. Until we got to Pittsburgh. The crowds there were huge and wildly enthusiastic. We were convinced that we would at least win Pennsylvania. Between the farmers and the steelworkers, who were really suffering, there was no way the state could go tor the Republicans (Ferraro 298)."

Listing the states she grirnly hoped could still be carried by the ticket, Ferraro also describes the repordog of the election by network TV:

"By election night, we only hoped to pick up a few states--Minnesota, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, possibly Illinois, and maybe even Iowa. But who knew how it would all turn out?...The election results coming in now on television were just slightly worse than the prime ribs we had ordered.

"One after another, states were going for Reagan. One network map of the United States was entirely blue for the Republicans. On another network the color motif was a blanket of red...and still we hadn't heard from the West Coast.

"It was ridiculous. We couldn't just sit there like corpses watching the Democratic ticket being slaughtered on television (Ferraro 299). " In fact, a few months later, the Democratic Party filed a lawsuit successfully challenging the over-projected network television coverage: the truth was, they had "called" some states in the West early enough to have affected the outcome in favor of Reagan. They had lost their objectivity. A judge in a court of law agreed. (Mayer and McManus provide other data on this time period.)

Goldman and Fuller provide the text of a memorandum to Reagan from former President Nixon. In it Nixon himself notes:

"Mondale can be said to have a fair chance only in the following states where the Reagan lead is few than ten points: Minnesota, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia. He has at best only an outside chance in the follo`mug states where the Reagan lead is between ten and 15 points: Illinois, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Missouri, California, Georgia and Tennessee. There are no other states in which Mondale has a chance? unless the polls are completely out of whack...Ohio and Michigan, which earlier were candidates for a Mondale win, have moved solidly into the Reagan column...Conceding Minnesota, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Washington and even Pennsylvania to Mondale, Reagan would still have an electoral landslide comparable to the one Eisenhower rolled up in 1956.

"The prospects in the senate are not as favorable...(Goldman and Fuller 451)."

Nixon goes on to add that "no Democrat could have won in 1984"--though this was before the election was over. Interestingly, we already see that Nixon's statement that "unless the polls are completely out of whack" is true in at least one of the states he mentioned--Illinois. "His" polls showed Reagan's lead there at "between ten and 15 points" --yet we just noted Ferraro's poll figures showing a Reagan Illinois lead of only two points. And, even in his opbmistic assessment, Nixon, like Ferraro above, wonders if Pennsylvania will go for Mondale.

To put this into even more pronounced perspective, let's go a bit further afield and bring in a name that didn't actually surface as Presidential timber among Democrats until the 1988 election. Let's bring in Lloyd Bentsen.

Bentsen's presence on the Democratic ticket in 1988 clearly had a pronounced effect. While it can be argued that several of the states added to the Dukakis column versus the Mondale column were a product of Bentsen, we must also analyze why. Why was Bentsen such a plus against Reagan and Bush?

To begin with, he brought Texas back into the fold as a potential target. Indeed, Bentsen's simultaneous Senatorial and Vice-presidential races are a bit of a puzzler. Since a Vice-president acts as a Senator in cases of a tie, one wonders: how does one interpret his Senate victory in Texas in 1988? In a sense, it could be argued that he brought Texas into Dukakis/Bentsen's Democratic column in 1988, on top of the other ten states the ticket carried. Even this, however, couldn't produce a Presidential election victory for the ticket.

But there's more. Several states in that election were close this time as they hadn't been previously. NBC-TV"s election night coverage revealed at least two other states as "flashers", not clearly going either way: Illinois and Pennsylvania. Only at the last minute was it clear which way they would go. Equally close was Maryland, a heavily-Catholic state and long a Democratic bastion. Similarly, Connecticut was close, as was, amazingly, Montana.

Elsewhere in the South a majority of counties in Georgia were in the Democratic column. In Louisiana the GOP carried that state by only a single digit--less than nine percent of the vote.

Even Reagan's California was down to the wire, with only the following day's results finally revealing who won there, despite Bentsen's slightly prernature concession statement to the media. At least one Congressional race in California was decided in a special election afterward, and went to the Democratic candidate amid the same field of votes. Bentsen's premature televised concession seems also to have affected voter turnout in western Michigan, as well.

In the Senate, at least one race was so close that it wasn't even decided by the end of the year. A special election had to be held to decide the result, with a subsequent election inquiry even then having to be called for. So did Buddy Mckay win that Senate seat in Florida? As the Iran/Contra, Iraq-gate and BCCI scandal inquiries broadened in the Congress, with Miami offshore CIA and Contra boat-based activities more clear, that became less and less clear.

Adding up the tally listed above, an Electoral College victory for the Dukakis/Bentsen ticket seemed much more likely. Had Bentsen not made his concession speech so early. Had ABC-TV not continued its 1984 policy of "calling" some close states too soon. (The other three TV networks had not pursued that policy in 1988, in the aftermath of the successful Democratic Party-backed lawsuit into "projections" by the TV networks in 1984's Presidential election night coverage. ) Had the votes been counted more closely.

Given that, the fact that a Democratic Party Electoral College victory might even have occurTed in the 1988 election must give us pause. Why the huge gap between 1984 and 1988? While existing, could it actually have been that vast? While it could still be argued that Mondale-Ferraro actually lost--as had McGovern-Shriver--could either of those tickets actually have lost by a 49-state margin? Or was the situation more complex? Was the outcome more murky? Even with the data previously on hand, we could say that it was.

First, let us look back at the 1972 Presidential election with this insight. McGovern­Shriver certainly benefited from the alienation of Wallace voters, who clearly didn't vote for a Nixon who may, at the time, have been perceived by most of them as having been behind not only Watergate but the shootings of JFK, King, RFK and now their own Wallace. Alabama was clearly not really a state in Nixon's column in 1972, no matter how one would like to imagine that it was.

Similarly, vote totals in Rhode lsland, Wisconsin, Oregon and Hawaii were not so comfortable for Nixon. Nor was the realization that 1972's premature "projections" by the TV networks were only a near-identical pre-dose of the phenomenon that re-occurred in 1984, and about which the Democrats won a lawsuit. Clearly, the prospect remained strong that McGovern-Shriver carried not only Massachusetts and Washington, DC, but also Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon and Hawaii.

One set of data suggested a McGovern-Eagleton ticket could also have still carried Missouri. A hospitalized George Wallace clearly would have carried his home state of Alabama, and a Virginia Elector gave one Electoral vote to the Libertarian Party that year.

That year, too, Nixon's 49-state sweep was rendered even more unlikely as to its legitimacy by the Democrats' retention of control of the Congress. Its claim to legitimacy is further shaken by the Watergate scandal, which revealed a widespread "dirty tricks" campaign by Nixon in 1972, including his tactics against Muskie, who had repeatedly topped Nixon in the polls. Therefore the wide gap between McGovern's on the surface 49­-state defeat and Carter's subsequent 1976 Presidential Electoral and popular vote victory, becomes more narrow.

Now that we've re-examined the winning fortunes of Jimmy Carter in 1976 against McGovern's defeat. we can apply a similar methodology to the 1984 election. We can look at the Democratic Party's actual fortunes in the 1980 election, the outcome of 1984, the outcome of l988 and the outcome of 1992 with a somewhat clearer perspective.

Clearly, a close count of the 1980 election's votes might have given several other states, including some southern states, to Carter-Mondale. Undercurrent events such as the one I\~e found further evidence of--the Iran hostage gambit--may have been largely responsible for that defeat. Clearly, polls showed that had the hostages been released by September or October, as they were on the way to being, Carter/Mondale would have won. (Mayer and McManus, 199, reveal an intriguing Oliver North to McFarlane memo exchange revealed during the Iran/Contra investigations.)

Therefore, subsequent inquiries in 1983 in the Congress into the Irangate issue and the attendant Debategate scandal--the theft of Carter's debate briefing manuaL which was admitted to by Reagan operatives before the 1984 election--had more impact than polls were revealing. Few poll questions ever addressed that issue among voters. Yet the issue was largely unresolved by the 1984 election and it had to have crossed the minds of many voters more than the polls were bringing out.

Subsequent "scandal mongering" books by Gary Sick and Barbara Honneggar on the "October Surprise" scandal have been discounted by critics as having been discredited due of lack of evidence. Yet, my research has brought the credibility of those claims back with a vengeance. Clearly, one could argue that Reagan/Bush cheated to win the 1980 Presidential election. Alternately, and equally clearly, one could also argue that, even with the votes that were available the day after the election, their margin was not so vast as it was presented.

A close examination of the tallies in sources such as the Hammond Almanac for 1980 reveals a close election even in such states as Arkansas, Florida, Alabama, Kentucky, California, New York, Michigan. Wisconsin, Missouri, Pennsylvania and New Jersey-­enough big states, in short, that Carter could have won in the Electoral College. There were significant numbers of "scattered" ballots in precisely those close states, as well-- the kind of situation in which recounts are often called. Yet, the sheer expense of the undertaking barred the Democratic National Committee from requesting such a recount.

In an appendix, the reader will see a useful formula for analyzing Bill Clinton's success against Bush in the 1992 election. Giving 75% of Perot's vote to Bush, 5% of it to Clinton, and leaving 25% of it out to compare the size of the relative margins of each in the contested states listed, one sees an interesting result. In several states, the vote for "other" is larger than the sub-1% margin, which is recount range. On top of that, 25% of Perot's vote in those states is clearly larger than the margin of Bush's carrying of them using that formula. Clinton clearly won 109 Electoral votes that year. Among the states in the solidly Ctinton column was Illinois.

In addition, though often derided as a "plurality President" that year, such a formulaic, rational evaluation of the vote totals reveals that Clinton seems much more likely to have carried several big Electoral vote states than the simple "plurality President" image would allow. Those states include Reagan's home state of California. Intriguingly, according to Loftus and Aarons, Clinton was told by Reagan himself that he'd voted for him over Bush that year (434).

Therefore, armed with such insights, we come back to 1984. The real sleeper story of that election is clearly detailed in The Secret War Against the Jews. Bush authorized, as the "real" NSC head of the '80s, a massive surveillance of all US Jews, a level of surveillance never before seen in US history. This is recorded in Loftus and Aarons as having taken the form of an "intelligence swap" between Britain's MI6 and the NSC. Britain's intelligence surveilled US Jews, US intelligence surveilled Britain's. Then, on a continuing basis throughout 1984, from May until December, the two "swapped". This, in effect, meant Bush had, American Jews under surveillance throughout the 1984 Presidential election (Loftus and Aarons 181-96, 420-1).

One readily sees the political repercussions, on brief reflection. In all Eastern and even in several Midwestern states, including several with large Electoral College vote counts, Jewish campaign workers were pivotal in the fortunes of the Democratic Party. iNnyone with advance knowledge of their plans and activities could sabotage the planning and success of the Democratic Party in those states. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that this data fills the gap between the fortunes of Dukakis/Bentsen and Mondale/Ferraro.

This is even more clear when we note that DukakisJBentsen, running in the wake of the Congressional inquiries into Iran/Contra and its attendant scandaLs--inquiries which clearly must have disrupted activities such as the surveillance of Jews as well--carried many of those very states. Intriguingly, while Illinois still didn't fall into the Democratic column in 1988 as Ferraro's 1984 polls had indicated, as noted earlier it was a "flasher" that year, on the NBC-TV coverage. However, ABC saw fit to "call" Pennsylvania early. An examination of the Bush margin there reveals it to be hair thin, amid a field of several "third" parties and "scattered" votes. And in 1992, Illinois went for Clinton, using the formula of 75% of Perot to Bush, 5% of Perot to Clinton, and 25% of Perot "disputed."

The fortunes of Geraldine Ferraro as a Vice-presidential candidate in 1984 came to symbolize the actual political clout of American women in many quarters. It came to symbolize, to some, that women were in fact a political paper tiger and that most women's issues could be put on the back burner. While Jews were a victim in the short-run of Bush's secret war against the. Jews, the main victims, in both the short and longer-runs, were US women.

This data helps to put that election back into the correct perspective. It helps to clarify how much clout American women actually have in the political realm. It should be seen for what it is: corrective data to more clearly focus on the real issues in American politics going into the millennium. Far from fairly defeating Mondale/Ferraro, with its first ever woman on the ticket, Reagan/Bush were in fact using Watergate-like surveillance against their political opponents' Jewish field operatives.

Those who have tried to use 1984's election results as a way to minimize women's influence on US politics will need to re-examine their premises, in light of this data. America's feminist leaders were not discredited in the way that the original data and its analysts have often suggested.

Something else was afoot than ordinary voters turning against women's issues in politics in 1984, something much more sinister. It had nothing to do with the Constitution of the United States or with majority politics. It had to do with a man with a painful secret in his past--a secret that, in his view, had to be kept at all costs. If my research is correct, it had to do with the Second World War, and George Bush's whereabouts on June 19, 1944.

Click here to see the Appendix, including more detailed statistical data comparing the Clinton/Bush/Perot vote in several states. (This is currently contained in an older, image file, with author's apologies for any inconvenience.--mcs)

Works cited:

Ferraro, Geraldine. My Story. New York: Bantam, 1985. 258-61, 265-7, 271, 296, 297 -98 305-6.

Goldman, Peter and Tony Fuller. The Quest for the Presidency 1984. New York: Bantam, 1985. 17 -19, 20-1, 249, 331, 348-9, 350, 360, 450-1, 454.

Honneggar, Barbara. October Surprise. New York: Tudor. 1989.

Loftus, John and Mark Aarons. The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Petrayed the Jewish People. New York: St. Martin's, 1994. 188-196, 406-9, 420-1, 434, 463 4.

Mayer, Jane and Doyle McManus. Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984­. Boston: Houghton, 1988. 4-5, 6-7, 11-12, 15, 16, 199, 358-9, 388-9, 391-2.

"Presidential Election Returns." Hammond Almanac for 1980.

"Presidential Election Returns for 1992." World Almanac for I994.

Sick, Gary. October Surprise. New York: Random, 1991.

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