Barbara Honneggar, in her book October Surprise, (New York: Tudor, 1989, Chapter IX, "The Name of the Rose," 229-244), deals with George Bush's possible dealings with an ultra-secret, organized crime-controlled organization called P-2. She describes the intricacies of the organizations' activities and the large number of "famous name" persons who have been members on one level or another. She then relates this to the "October Surprise" scandal that involved the alleged delay of the release of U.S. embassy hostages being held by the Iranian radicals in Tehran in 1980. This allegedly was engineered by Republicans to cause the defeat of then-President Jimmy Carter in the election of 1980.
Honneggar, with in-depth research on Bush's connections to organized crime and the right-wing "black" or secret, underground governments of Italy, France and several other nations, brings out how widely the phrase "White Rose" was used by George Bush and others who were allegedly involved in the wheeling and dealing which led to the "October Surprise." She weaves together a tapestry of individuals and organizations that reveals the complexity of a massive operation that involved several levels of activity.
One thing especially impressive about Honneggar's book is that she brings organized crime into the picture of these events. Organized crime fills in blanks that other iinvestigations hadn't or couldn't fill. She shows George Bush's possible links to Licio Gelli, a mobster whose heroin pushers were kidnapped by the same Iranian radicals who were holding the U.S. embassy hostages in Tehran in 1980. That kidnapping of Gelli's pushers occurred at almost the same time as the capture of those embassy personnel.
Honneggar thus reveals another dimension to this situation. Other investigators of the "October Surprise" scandal, such as Gary Sick, (author of October Surprise. New York: Random House, 1991), John Loftus and Mark Aarons (co-authors of The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People. New York: St. Martin's, 1994), though admittedly well-versed in the espionage end of things, would not have been familiar with this angle.
Honneggar also reveals how there may be several levels of meaning to the phrase "White Rose" aside from those involvingGelli, including one possible reference to the assassination of JFK. But Honneggar very carefully avoids tying her allegations about the "October Surprise" to JFK conspiracy theories. This does immense service to her cause, since these often get pretty far afield for the little physical evidence available--making it best not to base one's premises too strongly on them. (See, however, "'We Will Exterminate Them,'" for an interesting correlation of dates: 24 hours after the Ba'ath Party was thrown from power in Iraq in 1963, JFK was dead.)
Honneggar also brings out that there may have been a tie-in between the hostage scandal and the shooting of President Reagan, although she carefully avoids basing her whole premise on that prospect. (See also my chapters, "A Timetable To Power?" and "The 'Real Hero of Yom Kippur' and the October Surprise".) This scandal can stand on its own.
In addition to the impressive evidence presented by Honneggar's book, there is also that presented by Gary Sick, who points out the powerful connections between Carter National Security aide Donald Gregg and Alexander Haig at the time of the October Surprise. Other sources, such Len Colodny and Robert Gettlin in their book Silent Coup: The Removal of A President (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), bring out certain aspects of the Haig-Gregg relationship and the secret military relationship of Haig and Watergate investigative reporter Bob Woodward.
Coming on top of Honneggar's powerful suggestions of a mafia connection, there are also still other sources that are powerfully suggestive that an "October surprise" did occur. One additional powerful hint is found on pages 20-23 of Thomas B. Allen's book Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale (New York: Delacorte, 1988):...[T]he probability of compromise [of U.S. secret codes], which traced back to early 1968 and the Pueblo. Now, in the spring of 1980, some communications specialists in the U.S. armed services were undeer suspicion because experts were convinced that a compromise could have come only through the use of an agent, a mole in the lower ranks of the cryptography system...
"As planning went forward for a rescue attempt, concern increased taht military aspects of the operation would be discovered by the Soviets through the decrypting of U.S. military communications and then passed on to the Iranians. A virtual radio blackout was ordered. So secret was the concern, however, that all that could be handed down to lower military planning levels was the warning: Be extremely careful about communications before and during the rescue.
"The result, said a semiofficial [--my italics--mcs] review of the rescue, was 'the imposed silence on radio transmission was an underlying cause of the mission's collapse.'
Delta Force had 'achieved communications security, but at too high a price.' The extra-ordinary radio silence orders had puzzled and exasperated planners because they had not been given the tightly held knowledge that the U.S. cryptographic system was suspected of being compromised.'
"And that is at least why one intelligence official who heard the Nimitz 'launch' signal cold only hope that the mission would succeed. [--my italics--mcs: could this "official" have been Alexander Haig? Colodny and Gettlin tell us that he was, in fact, privy to top-secret cryptography during this time]. He suspected, by April 1980, that many, if not all, of the top-secret messages that had been flowing into the communications center on baord the Nimitz could be read in Moscow. He and the others who shared the awful suspicion could cling to only one long-shot possibility: that the Soviets were not being supplied keying materials promptly--in "real time"--but long after the keylists had been used.
"If that was what was happening, then Soviet AGIs, satellites and other electronic monitoring systems would be recording all US rescue-mission traffic (along with countless hours of useless administrative traffic) in anticipation of later possession of the keys for those days. They would then decode what they had recorded. If that was the way the US cryptogry was being penetrated, then the Soviets would not have the ability to act on the rescue information. But Soviet analysts would be able to understand and interpret U.S. naval operations in a crisis and could advise Kremlin strategists about the best ways to counter future U.S. naval action. Political-military analysts would be able to infer information about how US decision-making machinery works. 'It's like playing poker and knowing what was in the guy's last hand,' a US communications officer had later said (Allen 20-3)."
Again, I must ask: was this "officer" Haig?
As the Nimitz launched the rescue helicopters, says Allen(20-3), it was receiving and sending messages with some of the same types of cryptographic machines that had been on board the Pueblo when it had been captured twelve years earlier. The machine-keylist cryptographic system of 1968 was still used in 1980 on all US warships, military bases and intelligence communications centers (Allen 20-3).
"The precautions against cryptographic penetration had been considerable: virtual radio silence in the Nimitz much of the time, meager communications between units of the ill-fated rescue mission. But communications continued to be received by the carrier, the hub of information affecting the mission...
"Thus, the April 1980 rescue mission failed, in part--if not primarily--because of severe restrictions on communications due to the fears of the Soviet intercepts. Under President Carter's direction, planning then escalated to a more ambitious, military assault on Iran for possible execution in October--on the eve of the presidential election. Preparations for this operation ended abruptly when US intelligence indicated possible Soviet knowledge of the plans.
"The Soviet ability to read highly sensitive US military and diplomatic communications was a result of betrayal by Americans. The latest treachery had begun, exactly as a few intelligence officials had feared, probably in the month of the Pueblo capture, January, 1968...
"A] Soviet device, apparently built with the knowledge gained from the Pueblo and a [US defector named] Walker's contributions, could crack the logic of the [American] cryptographic machine[s]...
"Walker began a long betrayal, supplying secret documents and keylists from other machines...He gave the Soviet Union the keys that unlocked the codes guarding the nation's secrets. The keys still were in Soviet hands in 1980, when the hostage rescue mission failed.
By the time John Walker was arrested for espionage in 1985, the Soviet Union had received and decoded more than one million messages that United States military and intelligence units had sent through the cryptographic system (Allen 20-3).
Here we see how a major perspective present in the US military going into the 1980 hostage rescue mission was that it was unsafe to conduct even a limited US military operation against a Third World country such as Iran. The thinking, as implied above, was that this was a major strategic risk. Therefore, extreme measures were justified in ending it--even, perhaps, including the unseating of a President. With Haig's possible involvement in Watergate and the unseating of Nixon, as reported by Colodny and Gettlin, the likelihood that this was the goal is increased. Even the same major players, including key members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had played a major role in the end result of Watergate, may have been involved in "Irangate."
Another source that gives powerful hints in this direction is Admiral Stansfield Turner, in his book Terrorism and Democracy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1991). Turner, at the time of the hostage crisis, was Jimmy Carter's CIA Director (a possibly interesting link to George Bush) and also, (in a similar link to Haig), a former NATO commander. On page 118 of his book, Turner notes: "[As of April 23, 1980] We had no intelligence that indicated that the operation had been compromised..." Yet, mysteriously, Turner concludes that earlier, apparently off-key intelligence estimates that Russia had "tapped our phone" were in fact correct:
"Seven days after his inauguration, Ronald Reagan greeted the hostages and their families on the south lawn of the White House in a highly emotional ceremony. The new president used the occasion to lay down a marker on terrorism: 'Let terrorists be aware that...our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.' Clearly referring to President Carter's handling of the crisis, he added, 'We hear it said that we live in an era of limits to our powers. Well, let it also be understood that there are limits to our patience.'
"This attitude toward terrorists reflected the mood of the country...This...was a time for reflection and for a thourough-going, thoughtful analysis of how to do better if and when there was another hostage crisis. It looked at first as though there would be such a review when the new Secretary of State, General Alexander M. Haig, jr., elevated 'international terrorism [to] the place of human rights' as a top priority of American foreign policy in the Reagan administration....I knew his deep conviction that the Soviets would stoop to almost any level to undercut us. While I basically agreed with that, in this case I did not believe the facts supported his conclusion that the Soviets were the principal hand behind international terrorism, especially in light of Khomeini's violent dislike of them...Whatever the Soviet role actually was, our most severe problem at the moment was with the Iranians. Unfortunately, the only high level discussion of Iranian terrorism by the new administration appears to have been whether to honor President Carter's agreement with Khomeini's government...Eventually, President Reagan opted to honor the agreement.
"I was reminded of how peremptory President Carter had been with me when I had suggested at Camp David that we should agree to almost anything to get the hostages out and then renege as far as we could. On February 18 the [Reagan] State Department [now headed by Alexander Haig] issued a statement that the United States would observe the agreement, but added, 'The present Administration would not have negotiated with Iran for the release of the hostages.'
"The administration's policy, then, more or less evolved. First, it was speech writers who coined 'swift and effective retribution.' Now, it was public relations people papering over the fundamental difference between the President's advisors who favored accepting Jimmy Carter's negotiated deal and those who insisted on claiming that we would never again do such a thing. the result was a two-pronged policy: no negotiations and early resort to 'swift and effective retribution,' presumably by the use of military force.
"Yet I doubted that this or any administration would allow American hostages to languish rather than negotiate if retribution did not bring them home reasonably promptly. And did they really believe resort to military force could solve most problems with terrorist, or was that just talk? When Al Haig was asked what the President had in mind as retribution, he responded that the President was being 'consciously ambiguous' but that terrorists would understand....With all this emphasis on the use of force, I found it impossible not to wonder whether President Carter could have better used our military power in behalf of the hostages. Certainly, he could have set a different tone by immediately rushing Midway to the Persian Gulf as a show of force. He could have been even more threatening by ostentatiously bringing up additional forces. I believe he was unduly intimidated in the early days of the crisis by the students' threat of retaliation against the hostages if we moved forces toward Iran. When we did bring two aircraft carrier groups into the Arabian Sea after a few weeks, nothing happened....
"Mining...would have cut off all of Iran's external trade. That, combined with our freezing the bulk of Iran's financial reserves, would have had a severe economic impact. I still think we should have mined Iran's ports very early. Then, while we tried to bring about serious negotiations, Iran would have grown progressively weaker under our economic squeeze. Whether the students would have retaliated against the hostages, we'll never know.
"Also, President Carter should have used a rescue mission from the very start. He might have ruled it out because of the risk to the hostages, but the best time to have struck was before the students dug in and became organized. Our military was not capable of executing a rescue in the early days, but serious discussions of the option might have speeded the military's preparations." (Turner 155-8).
I believe a case could be made that Turner and most key players in the US military betrayed US hostage negotiation efforts on some level. Turner was probably not an activist in the matter. However, the role he may have played was to turn into a "neutral observer" of events. Paralyzed into inaction by his fear of being one-upped by more seemingly miltarily aggressive Reagan team military advisors, Turner failed to note and report events he probably observed, such as Haig's communications with Donald Gregg. A peculiar "blind spot" thus developed in the Carter Administration's highest National Security level posts. Hypnotically attracted to the "crypographic" argument presented by pro-Reagan JCS'ers, Turner blinded himself to their possible ill intent. As he demonstrates elsewhere in the text, even when he may have seen Gregg in communication with Haig, he failed to comprehend--or to want to comprehend--that such activities were on the "dovish" rather than the "hawkish" side:
"Why the Iranians decided to resolve the hostage issue is still a puzzle to me...[On November 2, 1980] President Carter interrupted campaigning when word reached him and returned to the White House. It did not take him long to see that the [Iranians] had thrown a monkey wrench into the works by adding amplifying conditions to Khomeini's terms. Some of these exceeded the President's authority...There was now no hope for an immediate release....Three of Reagan's advisors met in Washington with a representative of Khomeini to discuss the hostage issue. Although this meeting certainly took place, the result remains in dispute. Some claim there were more meetings and that a deal was made according to which Iran would withhold release of the hostages until after the election. In exchange the Reagan administration, once in office, would surreptitiously deliver arms to Iran. the advisors who met with the Iranian claim they rejected any such suggestion and stopped all contact. I have not found any evidence of such a deal, and it would have been so callous that I find the charge hard to believe....
"...It was a controversial idea inside of Iran, too. In late October, on his return from a visit to the United Nations in New York, the Iranian Prime Minister found it necessary to deny having gone to the United States in order to make a secret deal of hostages for arms to fight the war with Iraq. To Iranians, making a deal with the United States for arms was just as repugnant as it was to Americans to make a deal with Iran for hostages...." (Turner 150-3).
Yet, it is undeniable that, by 1983, Iran was accepting weapons from Israel, a nation that, if anything, was even more abhorrent o Iranian zealots than the US! Clearly, too, Turner knew this to be true. He also knew that the longer Iran "dickered" with the US, the more distrust would develop between it and other Mideastern and Arab nations. He simply tried to convince himself that his colleague Alexander Haig couldn't have engaged in such an activity. But, if Gary Sick is right, the evidence was all around him that Gregg had, indeed, betrayed "Carter's agreement."
It's intriguing, too, that Turner titles his chapter pertaining to the hostage negotiations "Carter's Deal: Too Late." Haig, Honneggar notes, (139-46) wrote in his memoir Caveat that he had agreed to honor "Carter's agreement:"
"On the same day, January 21, 1981, some of President Reagan's top advisors argued that "Carter's agreement" with Iran on the hostage release should not be kept, and Haig, was "horrified" at the suggestion and argued against it. In his book, he also said that William Casey, Reagan's new CIA director, and Richard Allen, the new national security advisor, were to two other top officials who found the idea of not keeping "President Carter's agreement" with Iran 'unthinkable.'" (Honneggar 139-146).
To what "Carter agreement" could they have been referring?
...[After dismissing several possible other explanations for Haig's phrase, Honneggar concludes:] The Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported in mid-October 1980, a few weeks before the election, that President Carter's CIA had set aside $160 million for 'reconciliation' with Iran within the context of the arms it needed for its war with Iraq...
There appears to be only one solution that makes sense of these facts. ..that CIA liaison Donald Gregg did negotiate a secret arms for hostages agreement with the Iranians and William Casey of the Reagan-Bush campaign, as has been reported, but did so, contrary to President Carter's wishes, with Bani Sadr's rivals, not with Bani Sadr, and on the understanding that the hostages would be released to Reagan and Bush, not to President Carter. Then, once Reagan and Bush were inaugurated, Casey would oversee the implementation of 'Carter's agreement ' from the CIA, and Gregg would shortly join the staff of Vice President Bush. Because their agreement may have been based on the never-acknowledged October 11, 1980, Carter offer of $150 million in arms and/or the $160 million CIA 'reconciliation fund,' it could have been loosely referred to by Haig on January 21, 1981, as 'Carter's agreement.' This would explain why those very officials who would have been knowledgeable about the 'turning' of President Carter's never-acknowledged arms-for-hostages offer against him--Casey, Haig, and Allen--were the very first Reagan-Bush officials who insisted on Reagan's first full day in office that not keeping 'Carter's agreement' with Iran would be 'unthinkable.'
On the same day, January 21, 1981, that Richard Allen insisted that not keeping 'Carter's agreement' with Iran would be 'unthinkable,' Reagan ordered
Allen to tell Iran 'the deal' was off unless the spouse of Allen's friend, then still held hostage, was freed in Tehran. I believe that history will show that the 'Carter agreement,' which Casey, Allen and Haig referred to that same day, was 'the deal.' It was probably based on a combination of President Carter's never-acknowledged and thus forgotten arms offer to Iran and Israel's self-serving 'understanding' that it could resume US arms shipments to the Khomeini regime once the hostages were freed. But it had long since become twisted from anything President Carter had had in mind, if he had knowledge of 'his' agreement at all (Honneggar 139-46).
The major connections between Bush and his cohorts, including Casey and Haig (in different ways), were mostly established during the Second World War, during the time when Allen Dulles of the OSS was attempting to cut his deal with the Axis behind the back of FDR. (See "Nelson Rockefeller: A Traitor Vice-President," "Encountering Prescott Bush," and "Tojo Out: The Mysterious Japanese Cabinet Shuffle of July, 1944.") Part of Dulles's efforts involved a German underground organization known as "White Rose." The organization was operated by German conservatives, for the purpose of killing Hitler and replacing him with a regime that would continue the war against Russia and Communism but make peace with the West. This latter position was on shared by Dulles. When more moderate German groups more sympathetic with making peace with both Russia and the West attempted to kill Hitler, Dulles may not have been of much help.
The efforts of OSS renegades (who may have included in their number not only Dulles but also William Casey), German conservatives led by the "White Rose" group, and others to kill Hitler and negotiate a "separate peace" with the Axis came to a white heat by the spring and summer of 1944, as the Presidential campaign was heating up. Once Dewey, the preference of Dulles and Rockefeller, was the GOP's nominee, major efforts were undertaken to set up a format for a new alliance with the former Axis in a war against Russia after Hitler was dead and Japan acknowledged Chiang Kai Shek as the ruler of "all of China." (These elaborate set-up attempts are described in several of my other essays, including "'Working With Chiang Kai Shek.'")
In any case, Bush's connection with all these World War II traitors were established during this time, during the "White Rose" assassination attempts. That phrase was to become the signal of the connection for the 1980 vice-presidential campaign of World War II veteran George Bush. To Bush's cohorts, it must have sounded not only like an insider's term, but a call for action. An old buddy needed their help.
Perhaps telegraphed, as well, was that there was a threat in the air for all of them, and hence an air of emergency may have been present. All the stops were to be pulled out. A major secret was under threat of being revealed. To ensure that it wasn't, must require still further secret activity: an "October surprise" for Jimmy Carter.
Click on "Back" (above" to return to the Table of Contents for Tim, George Bush and Me on the George Bush-Undercurrents Website.
Bowen, Russell S. The Immaculate Deception: The Bush Crime Family Exposed. Carson City, NV: America West, 1991. 165-6: Newly-significant data on how Dukakis campaign was "set up" by a group of Florida and Illinois bankers to get BCCI money--which was then "investigated" by Reagan/Bush Administration/operatives, who were actually even more deeply involved, in order to cut off funding for Dukakis TV ads in last weeks of 1988 after the Columbus Day "raid." Bowen also reveals, (76-80) in his section on the "October Surprise", an "update" on the supposed discrediting of the theory via the "discovery" of credit card receipts of Richard Brenneke during the time frame when he claimed to be flying to Paris meetings with the Iranians. Subsequent investigation by Barbara Honneggar (author of October Surprise. NY: Tudor, 1989) invalidated the claim these were Brenneke's credit card receipts when Franke Snepp, the reporter, was unwilling to produce them for examination. In addition, Bowen lists the several contradictory stories Bush, et al, have given as to where he was that weekend of October 19, 1980:
1. at a suburban country club outside Washington, DC (based on heavily-censored Secret Service records showing where Bush's Secret Service entourage stayed, obtained by PBS TV's Frontline program and which make no mention of Bush);
2. at home writing a speech, giving it, then returning at 9 p.m. (according to a Washington Times story);
3. had lunch with Supreme Court Justice Potter Steward and his wife (according to the Wall Street Journal's L. Gordon Crovitz).
Like Bush's varying versions of events in World War II, (Chi Chi Jima: was his plane on fire or not? were there Japanese planes in the air or not? were both crewmen already dead when he bailed out, or did one try to bail out, too? was his the only chute that opened? what angle did he dive from? These details can be important in trying to determine if Bush is distorting his activity over Chi Chi Jima in order to cover up the fact that he didn't know how to water land an aircraft and never had, as he alleges he did off Guam. Guam/Marianas: what ships were involved in his rescue? how many? how long was he gone? was he picked up separately from Delaney?) Bush, his apologists and his biographers give varying accounts on so many important points. Why does no one know?
Parry, Robert. October Surprise X-Files: The Hidden Origins of the Reagan-Bush Era. Arlington, VA: Media Consortium, 1996, 1997.1997.34- 49, 53-59; 61-9; 74-9; 82-8; 94-9; 100-21. Latest updates on Parry's research, interesting discoveries pertaining to the Rockefellers' ties to the Irangate scandal. This has implications for my research as well, since it provides further evidence of an ongoing interest by Big Oil in the activities of Iran and Iraq. Khomeini went back to the 1941 era, as did the Ba'ath Party's founders. Prescott Bush's activities should be described as "read: Rockefeller" since the latter tended to be the former's partner or boss. Similarly, Rockefeller ties to the October Surprise allegations further increase the likelihood that this "tangled web" included Prescott, sr., in it, going back to that 1941 Iraqi coup.
*-------. Trick or Treason: The October Surprise. New York: Sheridan Square, 1993. Source for the Frontline documentary of 1991, Parry went on to broaden and update his research.
Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale. New York: Delacorte, 1988
Bagby, Wesley; Marvin. The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations With China in World War II. Cranbury, NJ: Associated UP, 1992
Boller, Paul F. Presidential Campaigns. New York: Oxford UP, 1985
Bowen, Brig. Gen. Russell S. The Immaculate Deception: The Bush Crime Family Exposed. Carson City, NV: America West, 1991
Callahan, David. Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War. New York: Harper-Collins, 1990
Colodny, Len, and Robert Gettlin. Silent Coup: The Removal of a President. New York: St. Martin's, 1991
Grose, Peter. Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. Amherst: UP, 1994
Haig, Alexander M. Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy. New York: MacMillan, 1984
Higham, Charles. Trading with the Enemy: AnExposof the Nazi-American Money Plot, 1933-1947. New York: Delacorte, 1983
Honneggar, Barbara. October Surprise. New York: Tudor, 1989
Jens, Inge, ed., J. M. Brownjohn, trans. At the Heart of the White Rose: The Letters of Hans and Sophie Scholl. New York: Harper and Row, 1984
Litchfield, Michael and the "National Insecurity Council." It's A Conspiracy! Berkeley, Cal: Earthworks, 1993
Loftus, John and Mark Aarons. The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People. New York: St. Martin's, 1994
Lovell, Mary S. The Sound of Wings. New York: St. Martin's, 1989
Sick, Gary. October Surprise. New York: Random House, 1991
Simpson, Christopher. Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War. New York: Delacorte, 1988
Tarpley, Webster Griffin, and Anton Chaitkin. The Unauthorized Biography of George Bush. New York: Executive Intelligence Review/Ben Franklin, 1991
Turner, Adm. Stansfield (Ret.). Terrorism and Democracy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991.
United States Congress. House. Joint Report of Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980. Washington, DC: GPO, Jan. 3, 1993. Notes that it is impossible to determine the length and breadth of Reagan/Bush Administration hostages and arms dealings with Iran due to the shredding operation of November 1986.
United States Congress. Senate. The "October Surprise" Allegations and Circumstances Surrounding the Release of Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel. Washington, DC: GPO, Nov. 19, 1992. 36; 90-1; 93-9; 102;103-5; 114-21, ("Conclusions", esp. 120: 4; 120-1: 5); Appendix: 263-4: 14; 304: 27 (W. Casey's Amex receipt for 10/18/80), and 305: 28 (W. Casey's Amex receipt for 10/20/80: of possible significance is the absence of a Casey Amex receipt for 10/19/80). States in conclusion that "The great weight of the evidence is that there was no such deal, (115) but that "...numerous witnesses have testified that it was entirely within Casey's character and capabilities to embark on an 'extracurricula' hostage mission. Casey's O.S.S. background and his penchant for going outside normal channels are matters of record. His likely involvement in the Iran-Contra and "Debategate" scandals suggest a man strongly committed to the proposition that the ends justify the means.
"An evaluation of Casey's involvement in the hostage crisis is influenced by whether or not he met with the Karrubis in Madrid. This question has proven to be the most difficult of the investigation...(115-16)." (It goes on to absolve Casey of proven guilt.) However, a number of interesting bits and pieces are noted, (117-18):
"The evidence indicates that at least McFarlane knew in advance of the [L'Enfant Plaza] meeting that the hostage issue would be involved. [Rhet] Dawson stated stated that the man contacted [Senator John] Tower's office interested in talking about the hostages and stressing his ties to Khomeini. The sensitivity to the subject is apparent in Allen's bringing [attorney Lawrence] Silberman, a former Deputy Attorney General, along as a witness, and the choice of meeting in a hotel lobby several miles from Allen's downtown office. Even if the emissary made no mention before the meeting as to the subject matter, it it was clear he claimed to have Iranian conections and was interested in at least "US-Iran" relations. That topic, in September, 1980, inevitably included the hostages.
"Silberman and [Richard V.] Allen are credible in asserting that they told the emissary that the Carter Administration had jurisdiction over the conduct ofthe hostage crisis. There is no evidence that any of the Americans had any further dealings with the emissary or that any formal understanding was reached. But Allen's own memorandum suggests that the meeting was not intended necessarily as the last word: Allen wrote, 'Both Larry and I indicated that we would be pleased to hear whatever additional news Mr. Mohammed might be able to turn up, and I suggest that the information be communicated via a secure channel.' The tone of the memorandum does not correspond to testimony by all of the participants that the emissary was dismissed summarily...[And] they were operating on the outer limits of propriety, considering their status as private citizens without authority to interfere in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. (117-18)." On 120, the Report notes that "there is more to be done," and that.
"A review of the Hashemi electronic surveillance must be completed. About 150 reel-to-reel tapes have not yet been reviewed. In particular, the November-December 1980 intercepts should be reviewed with care. Just as time ran out for this investigation, Special Counsel had developed evidence that there may be been significant meetings in London and Paris in November 1980 involving Cyrus Hashemi, arms, hostages, and post-election hostages/arms meetings between Reagan operatives and Iranians or their emissaries. Such meetings would have had as their objective a solution to the hostage crisis prior to the Reagan Administration's coming into office. The propriety of such meetings during a transition period is debatable; all would agree that such contact would be qualitatively different than contact prior to the election [such as the aformentioned Madrid, Paris or L'Enfant Plaza meetings--mcs] (120)."
An interesting link not often investigated by researchers, Congressional and otherwise, in this area, is the idea that Israel was not deeply involved, that the arms in question were promised by Far Right forces in Europe and the Middle East, including P-2, whose personnel the Iranians were also holding hostage. This point is briefly touched on by Barbara Honneggar, who, however, chooses to go back to "blaming Israel" for the arms brokering.
The focus on Israel was always a red herring. Robert Maxwell, the only Jew involved (in 1980 not an "acknowledged" Jew), was probably active during the transition period in arranging bribes for the KGB-funded Palestinians, via his KGB-USSR ties in publishing. Key to Maxwell's involvement was the involvement of P-2 and Bush's help to Saddam's Iraq. Maxwell sought to soften Bush's pro-Iraq position. In the event, he caused Bush to adopt the strategy of Saddam as the "stick" to P-2's "carrot" of a Muslim arms deal.
Most arms promised were clearly not delivered, between Haig's being "on the outs" with Bush and Bush's determination to side with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict, which he'd probably goaded Saddam to start in August and September 1980, through his family's 1941 and his personal January 1977 ties to Saddam's family and Ba'ath party--ties that he probably also saw were presented to the Iranians. That influenced their basic decision of August-November of 1980 not to release the hostages before the US election was over, then to release them at a "neutral" time between administrations, so that no President could claim credit.
Maxwell's bribes of the Palestinians, however, delayed the hostage release until after Reagan's inauguration. He did so in completion of his deal with Bush and P-2 to not publish "the first edition of the Immaculate Deception, " so that those parties would (1) get Haig- accessed NATO arms to Iran out of Germany (arms that weren't delivered); and (2) back off from supplying Iraq with nuclear weapons--which was understood as Bush's position.
By June, Israel knew the promised arms weren't going to Iran. It simultaneously concluded Bush's passivity in the face of Iraq's growing nuclear threat. That lead Israel to bomb the Osirak reactor that month. No actual Israeli arms were ever involved in the "October surprise" and the only Jew involved in ANY of it was Robert Maxwell. Haig resigned when he learned he couldn't "keep his word" to the Iranians in following up on the
NATO reforger stores requistions he'd shown them via Donald Gregg.
Loftus and Aarons are not far wrong in asserting no Israeli involvement in the "October surprise" and that even Israel's alleged involvement in Iran-Contra was largely a "set up" by Bush to blame Israel for the whole "shibang." Where researchers have gone wrong, as stated earlier, has always been in looking for Israelis. The arms dealers in question were on the Far Right, (as represented by players such as Big Oil and German industrial interests), not Israelis. The Far Right played on its common appeal in both
Iraq and Iran as to its "anti-British" history. This, in turn, was cynically manipulated by MI-6 in Britain itself, with whom Casey had "ancient" ties.
The Far Right determined that Ba'ath, with its living connection to Vichy agents in Syria of WW2, was the last living wing of the Nazi party. Though Khomeini had criticized the "old Shah" during the War, he had, in the end, been strangely silent about the joint British-Soviet occupation of Iran of 1941--the threat of the repeat of which was another ploy Bush used in dealing with Khomeini, as he pointed (through "go-betweens") to how Standard Oil personnel had sought to help Iran "go its own way" from Britain in June-August, 1941. (Based on Foreign Affairs from 1941.)
Just that, without any talk about arms, would have gotten Bush's "foot in the door" with Khomeini. He could then merely point to his equally "legitimate" (that is, anti-Britiish) ties to Saddam's Ba'ath Party, going all the way back to the Raschid Ali coup of April-May 1941. Bush and his family--and Standard Oil--were, ironically, one of the few in the world that had befriended "both sides" of the Iran-Iraq War, back in 1941.
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